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Abstract 
This paper uses novel data on the employment histories of a large fraction of the US 
workforce to present empirical evidence that corporate technological investment has a 
significant impact on workers’ subsequent labor market outcomes. Exploiting leveraged 
buyouts as shocks to firms’ production technologies, we find that employees retained 
after a private equity acquisition experienced increased long run employment tenures, 
reductions in short run unemployment durations, and higher rates of within-occupation 
mobility. The evidence supports the view that private equity investment, by upgrading 
the technology and operations of the firm, imparts valuable and transferable human 
capital to retained workers. The effects are especially pronounced for workers in 
occupations complementary to IT-enabled work practices, and for those who are 
employed at the acquired firm for longer durations before exit. The findings suggest 
that employers’ investments in information technology are a critical determinant of 
human capital stock and subsequent labor outcomes for workers. 
Keywords:  information technology, skills, private equity, labor, employment 
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Introduction 
Despite an enormous amount of interest in the academic literature on the effects of IT investment on firm 
productivity (e.g. see Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996), there has been little attention paid to how the benefits 
derived from these productivity improvements are divided between firms and workers. This is especially 
surprising given the continuing concerns about unemployment in a number of labor markets around the 
world. This paper argues that the skills that workers acquire when their employers’ invest in new 
information technologies play an important role in explaining workers’ long-term labor outcomes. A 
common view is that the rapid pace of recent technological change has led to a gap between the level of 
technical skills demanded by firms and the human capital supplied by workers. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper examining firms’ technological investment as an important channel for 
skill acquisition among workers, and correspondingly, as an explanation for their labor outcomes. 
Empirical identification of the impact of firms’ technological investments on workers’ labor market 
outcomes is difficult for two reasons.  The first is that there are limited data containing detailed 
information on both worker characteristics and firm characteristics pertaining to the labor force. Many 
datasets contain information on workers alone, without corresponding information about employers, such 
as the Current Population Survey or the Census.  On the other hand, datasets such as Compustat contain 
detailed information about publicly traded firms, but lack information about the workers employed by 
these companies. A second problem is that even if such data were available, there is a challenging 
identification problem: it is difficult to estimate the causal impact of firm investment on worker outcomes 
and to distinguish this effect from other important factors such as the selection of workers into firms with 
different investment patterns. 
To address these difficulties, we construct a novel dataset containing detailed information on the career 
paths of U.S. workers, with in-depth information on their employers (both public and private). 
Specifically, using data collected through a proprietary agreement with one of the largest US job boards, 
we analyze employment histories for a large fraction of the US labor force over the last two decades.  The 
novelty of these data is that they allow us to bring together employer characteristics and workers’ career 
outcomes in the same dataset, and therefore to examine how differences in employer characteristics—and 
in particular, technological investment—impact the labor outcomes of workers emerging from these firms. 
To address the identification challenge, we consider an exogenous shock to the firm’s production 
technology—leveraged buyouts (LBO) by private equity firms—that has been shown in prior research to be 
associated with the introduction of IT-enabled work practices into acquired firms.  We provide supporting 
evidence for this relationship, and then use matching estimators to compare workers employed at LBO 
acquisition targets before the LBO who exit after the LBO is completed with workers who are employed at 
other firms during the equivalent time period and are similar across all firm and worker characteristics 
including race, gender, occupation, experience, education, industry, and employer performance. After 
matching on these characteristics, we show that employees retained at LBO targets after the acquisition 
have greater long-run and short-run employment durations in subsequent years and are more likely to 
find work in the same occupations when displaced from their current employer. These results are 
consistent with the acquisition of skills complementary to new information technologies and increasingly 
demanded by IT-intensive firms, and the effects are strongest for college-educated workers and for 
workers in jobs requiring skills complementary to new IT-enabled production methods, such as problem 
solving and decision-making. 
There are a number of alternative stories that we attempt to rule out by examining various contrasts in the 
data. Better labor outcomes for workers leaving private equity (PE) managed firms may be due to 
differences in labor market signaling (Gibbons and Katz 1991) or unobserved human capital for workers 
that were employed at these firms but not caused by the LBO.  However, we find no labor market 
differences for workers who leave the LBO target immediately after the acquisition, which is more 
consistent with human capital acquisition than with labor market signaling.  Furthermore, the effects are 
not significant for workers who are employed at the LBO target but leave the acquired firm before the 
acquisition date, which suggests that the effects are not due to other employer differences unless those 
factors are also changed by the buyout. 
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, this paper presents novel evidence that corporate IT 
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investment decisions impact workers’ long run labor market outcomes through skill acquisition. The 
literature on technological investment has focused almost exclusively on explaining firm-level outcomes 
(e.g. Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996). Notable exceptions examine how technological investment impacts the 
demand for skilled vs. unskilled labor (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002) as well as the substitution 
of IT for labor (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1995; Dewan and Min 1997) but recent work emphasizes moving 
beyond education levels towards examining tasks and technologies when explaining labor market trends 
(Acemoglu 2011). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to connect technological investment, 
the focus of a very large literature in IS and economics, to the labor outcomes of US workers through the 
skill acquisition channel. 
This paper also contributes to the labor economics literature and the literature on private equity 
investment. Canonical models of labor market outcomes abstract from the importance of employer 
characteristics (due in part to the data limitations described above); this paper highlights an important 
link between corporate policies and labor market outcomes. The results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that workers are acquiring human capital that they would not have acquired if they had been employed at 
firms using older management practices, and that this human capital proves beneficial in the labor market. 
These findings suggest that corporate investment is important for understanding the supply-side of the 
market for the skills demanded by firms using information technologies. This paper also presents the first 
evidence of how PE investment impacts the labor market outcomes of workers employed by acquired 
firms. A long standing debate in both academic and policy circles concerns the impact of private equity on 
workers; this debate is rife with strong points of view but limited by a dearth of empirical evidence.1  The 
evidence in this paper suggests that one way in which private equity firms impact workers is through the 
acquisition of human capital resulting from working with improved production technologies introduced 
into PE managed firms. 
Background 
An influential literature has focused on the rapid uptake of IT-enabled work practices by employers over 
the last several decades and on the value of these modern work practices for improving labor productivity. 
This literature argues that complementarities exist between work practices complementing IT use, such as 
decentralized decision making, team-based problem solving, skill training, quality circles, and screening 
for more educated workers (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002; Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 1998). 
The adoption of these work practices has been associated with improved product and service quality in a 
variety of occupational contexts from manufacturing to customer service and sales (Milgrom and Roberts 
1995; Batt 1998; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1995; Huselid 1995; Macduffie 1995). 
The adoption of these ‘high-commitment’ work practices has been associated with higher performance, in 
part, because they encourage discretion and facilitate human capital acquisition by employees, which is of 
importance, for example, given the emphasis on process control and diagnostic problem-solving 
emphasized by modern IT-enabled production systems. Osterman (1995) presents survey evidence 
demonstrating that organizations using high performance work systems invest more heavily in training 
than other establishments.  Training investments, in particular, have been a focal element in the literature 
on high-commitment work practices (Macduffie 1995), and studies have shown that firms that use 
information technologies and high performance work practices tend to select workers based on problem 
solving ability and to invest in the development of problem-solving skills within the workforce. Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson (1997), analyzing large-scale survey data, conclude that IT use is complementary with pay-
for-skills and promote-for-skills practices, increased training levels, and the hiring of workers who are 
more easily able to acquire new skills. Complementarities between work practices imply that firms adopt 
‘bundles’ of these practices together—in other words, firms using IT-enabled production processes must 
invest in training their employees in new tools and technologies. Adopting modern work techniques 
without investing in employee skills does not produce the desired performance effects, and correlations 
reported in prior work suggest that the importance of combining these work practices have been 
embraced by managers of high-performance organizations. 
                                                             
1 This debate received worldwide attention in the 2012 U.S presidential election, as many observers questioned the 
impact of private equity firms such as Bain Capital on the workers employed by companies acquired in LBO’s. 
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The key hypothesis tested in this paper is that workers employed in firms using IT-enabled work practices 
acquire transferrable skills that complement the use of new production technologies. Although it is 
difficult to directly observe skill acquisition in workers, we can observe manifestations of skill acquisition 
such as differences in labor market outcomes. Specifically, transferrable skills should make it easier for 
displaced workers to find subsequent employment in other firms in the same occupations relative to 
comparable workers without these technical skills. 
To test this hypothesis, we use private equity acquisitions as an exogenous shock to the firm’s production 
technology. We first provide direct empirical evidence that private equity transactions accelerate 
investment in information technologies. We then show that workers retained after an acquisition benefit 
from exposure to these work practices through skill upgrading.  This is consistent with a recent empirical 
literature directly connects private equity with the introduction of modern manufacturing practices to 
acquired firms.  Bloom and colleagues (2009) provide survey evidence that private equity managed firms 
have superior operating performance than other firms, and in particular, that the population of private 
equity managed firms does not suffer from the badly managed tail of firms that can be observed under 
other forms of corporate governance. Using survey data, they show that private equity managed firms are 
especially strong at using modern manufacturing practices and complementary HRM practices. Amess 
and colleagues (2007) show increased levels of discretionary decision-making after a buyout for skilled 
employees. Bruining (2005) finds that managers report higher use of high-commitment work practices 
after a buyout including employee involvement and training. 
Although limited, there is also case evidence in the business press providing direct support that human 
capital acquisition occurs after a leveraged buyout. Greeley describes operations improvements at the 
Heat Transfer Products Group, a private equity acquisition focused on industrial refrigeration products 
(2012).  For Monomoy capital, the private equity firm that acquired HTPG, Greeley writes “they visited 
hundreds of plants. The better-performing companies consistently used some form of the Toyota 
Production System. The partners began to realize that the traditional private equity approach to 
operations—putting a former CEO on a company’s board—wouldn’t work for some of their purchases. 
“You could have the best CEO in the world,” Hillenbrand says, “but in a manufacturing company profits 
are made on the floor.”  He goes on to describe his experiences at the firm during the period immediately 
after acquisition when the private equity firm introduced experts to train workers in kaizen practices on 
the assembly floor. In the remainder of the paper, we test the hypothesis that these types of interventions 
provide transferable skills to employees in jobs that are complementary to IT-enabled work practices. 
Data 
We construct a novel dataset containing information on career outcomes for individual U.S. workers, with 
detailed information on their employers. In contrast to employer-employee matched datasets commonly 
used in other studies such as the LEHD (Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics data compiled by 
the U.S. Census Bureau), we have information on the specific occupations and job titles held by employees, 
and we can track their movements both within and across firms in depth (typically, the LEHD do not 
contain data on workers’ occupations or skills and Current Population Survey data cannot be used to 
obtain employer identifiers). 
 
The data were obtained through a proprietary agreement with one of the largest jobs boards focused on 
the US labor market. Job seekers use the website to post resumes and look for jobs. The population 
includes both workers who are actively seeking new jobs, and those who may not be actively seeking new 
jobs, but would consider switching employers under appropriate conditions. The company has extensive 
data on the employment histories of workers stored in its databases. The raw data used for the creation of 
this database comes from job history (resume) information posted or updated by active and passive job 
seekers on the web site through 2010. Typical resumes contain information about a worker’s prior 
employers, employment timing, education, skills, and job titles. Additionally, on this jobs board, workers 
enter data about their occupational affiliation and most recent wages. 
 
Most fields in the data, such as education, experience, and occupation are structured, but employer name 
is a free-text field that is standardized and linked with external databases. Firm names are linked to 
Capital IQ identifiers by using fuzzy text-matching algorithms developed by Capital IQ. This fuzzy text 
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matching on firm name is similar to the methods used in the construction of both the LEHD and NBER 
patent databases. The final processed database includes, for each worker, occupation, human capital 
variables, most recent wages, and employment histories with firm identifiers that can be matched to 
external databases on LBO activity. 
Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics  
This table presents summary statistics describing the characteristics of the sample dataset, and for comparison, the characteristics of the U.S. labor 
force (taken from the 2012 March CPS Supplement). Number (% Sample) refers to the number (percentage) of individuals in the sample dataset. % CPS 
Sample refers to the percentage of individuals in the U.S. workforce as of 2012 with the following attributes (estimates are weighted by individual 
supplement weights).  
 
% Resume Sample % CPS Sample 
Panel A: Gender   
Female 52% 47% 
Male 48% 53% 
   
Panel B: Education   
4 year college 21% 21% 
High School 33% 27% 
2 year 20% 19% 
Graduate Degree 10% 8% 
Vocational 9% 10% 
Doctorate 1% 2% 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Occupations vs. U.S. Labor Force 
This figure depicts the distribution of occupations across workers in our sample dataset, relative to the distribution of occupations across workers in the 
U.S. labor force. Estimates for the U.S. labor force are computed using Occupational Employment Statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  
 
Comparisons for these workers are shown in Table 1. The resume sample includes workers with a broad 
spectrum of educational attainment levels. Administrative data sets, such as the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) and the Occupational Employment Survey (OES) are useful benchmarks for comparison 
because they are representative of the US workforce. We compare the educational distribution of the 
population against the educational distribution in the Current Population Survey. Although there are 
significant differences between the two samples, the workers in the resume-based sample do not exhibit 
systematically more or less education. Occupational comparisons between the two groups are shown in 
Figure 1.  Customer service, management, information technology, sales, and retailing professions are 
especially well represented. To compare the resume-based sample with the OES sample, we mapped the 
occupational sub-categories in the data to the major occupational headings in the Standard Occupational 
Classification system preferred by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. There is some over-sampling in the 
management, business, and computer sectors, and under-sampling in the clerical, production, and sales 
sectors. 
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Analysis 
Private Equity Investment in Information Technology 
Before examining worker outcomes, we provide evidence of the impact of private equity ownership on 
firms’ IT investment by constructing annual measures of the total inflows of IT workers. This approach of 
aggregating individual worker paths to construct sample inflows has been used extensively in the labor 
literature, most notably by Davis and Haltiwanger (1994) and also by prior work using similar data 
sources (Tambe and Hitt, forthcoming).  We use this measure as a proxy for the investments that a firm 
makes in information technology.  Studies have shown that firms with upgraded production processes use 
significantly more IT labor (Tambe and Hitt 2012; Tambe, Hitt, and Brynjolfsson 2012).  These workers 
facilitate the integration of IT products and services with the existing operations of the firm, as discussed 
above.  Specifically, we estimate the impact of an LBO on IT investment by estimating a linear regression 
of the following form: 
 
(1) Log(IT Flow)it= β1(LBO Treatmenti)+β2(LBO Treatmenti*postit)+vi+wt+uit 
 
where we define Log IT Flowit as the natural logarithm of the number of IT workers who are hired by firm 
i in year t. We regress this measure on LBO Treatmenti and LBO Treatmenti x Postit, an indicator variable 
for whether firm i is ever acquired in an LBO, and an interaction term with Postit (an indicator for whether 
the firm has been acquired by a PE group), respectively. We also include controls for year and firm fixed 
effects. The year fixed effects ensure that we control for aggregate trends in IT investment impacting all 
firms in the sample, while firm fixed effects control for heterogeneous flows in IT labor due to fixed firm 
attributes, such as industry or average size. 
 
Table 2: Impact of Leveraged Buyout on IT flows 
This table reports estimates of the impact of LBO’s on the annual flow of IT labor into the firm using data on IT labor investment at the firm level on 
sample firms from 1995 through 2010. The dependent variable in both columns is the log of the quantity of incoming IT workers at the firm in a given 
year. Column (1) includes controls for whether or not the firm was ever an LBO target during our sample years and a dummy variable (post-LBO) 
indicating whether the firm has already been acquired through an LBO, as well as year fixed-effects.  Column (2) includes both year and firm fixed-
effects. Standard errors are reported in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
 Log(IT flows) Log(IT flows) Log(IT flows) Log(IT flows) Log(IT flows) 
Years 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2000 2000-2010 2003-2010 
Post-LBO .0675* 
.0353 
.0383** 
.0162 
.0183 
(.0534) 
.0622** 
(.0197) 
.103** 
(.0257) 
LBO target y/n .0314 
.0295 
    
Controls Year Year 
Firm Effects 
Year 
Firm Effects 
Year 
Firm Effects 
Year 
Firm Effects 
Observations 143,360 143,360 46,362 107,342 76,718 
 
The results are presented in Table 2.   Columns 1 and 2 show coefficient estimates for β2 ranging between 
0.0383 and 0.0675. These results indicate that IT labor flows increase by approximately 3% to 7% 
following a private equity acquisition.  The effects are primarily driven by LBO’s starting in the year 2000, 
rather than LBO’s which took place in the mid 1990’s, as illustrated in columns 3 through 5.  For the years 
1995 to 2000, the coefficient estimate on the treatment effect is economically small and statistically 
insignificant (0.0183), whereas post-LBO IT flows increase substantially following the technology boom in 
the late 1990’s; the coefficient estimates for β2 reaches up to 0.103.  Overall, the results confirm the views 
from the survey evidence and anecdotes discussed earlier: PE ownership leads to greater IT investment. 
 
Labor Market Outcomes 
Empirical Framework 
To measure the impact of PE investment in IT on workers’ labor market outcomes, we utilize nearest 
neighbor matching estimation (Imbens & Abadie 2006). We estimate the treatment effect using matching 
methods rather than regression methods because a regression framework produces biased estimates of 
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treatment effects for dependent variables that are censored and have non-normally distributed error 
terms (as is common for measures of employment and unemployment durations).  Moreover, regression 
methods require functional form assumptions about the empirical relation between firm characteristics 
and labor market outcomes. There is no prior theoretical or empirical work that precisely establishes what 
the correct functional form should be, so whatever form we choose will be somewhat arbitrary. To the 
extent that the functional form we choose is mis-specified relative to the true model, our estimates of the 
treatment effect will be biased by specification error. Misspecification is likely to be especially costly in our 
setting, because the distribution of selected explanatory covariates in the control sample may be 
significantly different from the distribution of explanatory covariates in the treatment sample; this 
difference could potentially exacerbate estimation bias due to model misspecification. 
 
We are most interested in estimating the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT), rather than the 
average treatment effect for the entire sample (ATE) or the average treatment effect for the controls (ATC). 
Estimating the ATE or ATC is potentially problematic because of differences in the size and characteristics 
of the control and treatment samples. In order to estimate the ATE or ATC, it would be difficult to find the 
requisite observations in the treatment sample that could be used as matches for observations in the 
control sample. In turn, poor matching between the treatment and control sample could severely bias the 
estimated ATE or ATC (see Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens 2004; Imbens 2001; and Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd (1998) for related discussion). 
 
To identify the impact of PE investment on labor market outcomes, we define our treatment sample by 
identifying workers who have been directly impacted by LBO’s during their tenure at a given company. 
For each job record in our dataset, we can identify the start and end dates for a particular job title held by 
an individual worker at a given company. We use Capital IQ to identify whether the company gets 
acquired in a leveraged buyout at any time between the start and end dates of the job held by the 
individual. We construct our treatment sample by aggregating all such instances, and thus identify the set 
of workers in our data employed at a company at the time that a leveraged buyout becomes effective. We 
identify 5,285 such workers in our sample.2 
Table 3. Treatment vs. Control Characteristics  
This table presents summary statistics describing the characteristics of the workers who leave firms that are acquired in LBO’s vs. workers who do not 
leave firms acquired in LBO’s. % Sample refers to the percentage of individuals in each group for which data is available.  
 
% Treatment Sample % Control Sample 
Panel A: Gender   
Female 51% 52% 
Male 49% 48% 
   
Panel B: Education   
4 year college 34% 33% 
High School 30% 27% 
2 year 20% 20% 
Graduate Degree 10% 9% 
Vocational 5% 9% 
Doctorate 1% 1% 
 
To construct our control sample, we draw from the remaining pool of workers who do not experience an 
LBO during their careers. There are 875,756 such workers. For each worker in our treatment sample, we 
use the nearest-neighbor matching algorithm to identify (at least) four matches from our control sample.3  
That is, for each treatment observation, we identify four workers from the control sample whose 
characteristics are most similar to the treated individual’s characteristics, where worker traits are 
measured prior to the LBO transaction. As a starting point, we match on 2-digit Standard Industry 
                                                             
2 In this version of the paper, we examine a random 10% sample of the total data available in the job search database; 
the results are similar for smaller subsets of data, such as random 5% samples. The next version of this paper will 
contain results for a larger sample.   
3 The nn-match procedure developed by Abadie and Imbens allows for “ties”; that is, if multiple control observations 
are equidistant from a given treatment observation, all observations are used with the appropriate weighting matrix. 
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Classification (SIC) industry, 2-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) occupation, gender, race, 
level of education, years of prior labor market experience, and the year in which the individual started the 
specific position held during the LBO transaction. We weight the start year by a factor of 1,000 relative to 
other covariates, to ensure that we are comparing workers who join a particular position across firms at 
the same time, to control for differences in accumulated human capital over time.4  Table 3 contains 
statistics describing the characteristics of workers in our treatment and control sample using this 
matching scheme. As illustrated across various characteristics, the workers in the treatment and control 
sample are remarkably similar across many dimensions. The distribution of race, gender, and education 
of workers in the treatment sample mirrors that of the matched control sample. 
Employment Tenure 
We utilize the Abadie and Imbens (2006) matching procedure to estimate mean differences in long-run 
employment durations for workers who leave companies acquired by PE firms and workers leaving 
companies that do not get acquired by PE firms. For each worker in our treatment and control samples, 
we define Post Employment Duration as the length of time spent employed that elapses between the date 
that a treated worker joins a firm acquired in an LBO, and the date that the worker ends her last known 
job spell.  This measure is annualized, to allow for comparisons across pairs of workers with different 
career lengths. For each worker in the treatment sample, we use the nearest-neighbor matching algorithm 
to identify four observations from the control sample that most closely match the pre-LBO characteristics 
of the treated worker, and we estimate the mean difference in total annualized employment duration for 
workers across the two groups. We estimate the ATT by finding control matches for each observation in 
the treatment sample; we do not identify corresponding treatment matches for observations in the control 
sample (which would otherwise allow us to compute the ATC and/or the ATE). 
 
Table 4. Impact of Leveraged Buyouts on Worker Employment Duration (Long Run) 
This table reports mean differences in long run employment durations (annualized) for workers of firms acquired in leveraged buyout (LBO) 
transactions and similarly matched workers at firms that are not acquired in LBO’s. Standard errors are reported in italics underneath the coefficient 
estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Workers who are employed at acquired firm at the time of the LBO transaction 
LBO Treatment 0.105*** 0.094*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.093*** 
 0.034 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 
      
No. of obs. 19,296 27,640 28,321 28,326 34,110 
      
Panel B: Workers who leave acquired firm prior to LBO transaction 
LBO Treatment 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.007 
 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 
      
No. of obs. 17,789 25,653 26,296 26,301 31,723 
      
Match Variables:       
   Assets x  x x x 
   Return on Assets  x x x x 
   Capital Intensity    x x 
   Unemployment   
   Duration  
    x 
      
Table 4 presents the ATT estimates for various combinations of worker and firm characteristics used to 
match individuals across samples.  In Panel A, the treatment effect is presented for workers employed at 
the acquired firm during the LBO transaction (treatment sample A). Panel B presents estimates of the 
treatment effect for workers who are employed at the acquired firm but leave prior to the LBO taking 
place (treatment sample B). The control sample for both panels consists of workers who never work for 
firms that get acquired in an LBO. LBO Treatment is defined as a binary indicator for whether the 
                                                             
4 The results are not sensitive to this weighting scheme.  Estimates based on an equal weighting scheme yield similar 
results.   
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individual works for a firm that gets acquired in an LBO. Across all specifications, workers are matched on 
individual person and firm characteristics: race, gender, education, occupation, starting year of the 
position held at the time of the treatment, years of labor market experience up until the starting year, total 
years of observed employment history, and firm industry. Across specifications, we match workers based 
on firm characteristics such as Assets (defined as the book value of firm assets), Return on Assets (defined 
as the ratio of operating earnings to assets), Capital Intensity (defined as the ratio of net plant, property, 
and equipment to assets), and individual characteristics such as Unemployment Duration (defined as the 
length of an individual’s unemployment spell immediately prior to the matched position). 
 
Column 1 of Panel A illustrates that the annualized employment tenure for workers who leave LBO firms 
is approximately 0.105 years longer than similarly matched workers who leave comparable firms.  Adding 
additional variables to improve the matching precision in columns 2 through 5 does not materially change 
the treatment estimate.  The annualized difference in employment durations ranges between 0.087 years 
and 0.105 years. The results support the view that PE investment has a significant impact on workers; in 
the long run, it appears that workers who exit LBO firms appear to have longer employment tenure at 
subsequent establishments. We also assess whether differences in employment durations are driven by 
the LBO rather than systematic differences in the employment durations of workers who leave firms that 
become acquired vs. workers who leave other, comparable establishments that do not get acquired. Panel 
B presents treatment estimates for workers who join and leave firms that eventually get acquired, prior to 
the LBO actually taking place.  As illustrated in columns 1 through 5 of Panel B, the treatment estimates 
are all economically small and statistically insignificant, indicating that the observed differences in 
employment durations for workers existing LBO firms is causally linked to the LBO.   
 
The findings in Table 4 suggest that PE investment is associated with changes in worker outcomes.  These 
results, alone, however, do not sufficiently illustrate whether the link between PE activity and worker 
labor market outcomes is through technology investment imparting skills to workers. Human capital, by 
its nature, is difficult to observe, let alone quantify. To provide additional supporting evidence for this link, 
we focus on workers in occupations known to complement IT enabled work practices, following the 
extensive literature on productivity and organizational practices discussed above.  For each worker’s job 
title, we parse the description of the tasks completed by the worker on her resume to identify the 
individual’s specific SOC code, at the 6-digit level.  Using the person’s SOC code, we match the occupation 
to the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL) Survey of Work Activities to approximate the various tasks that 
are expected of a worker within a particular class of occupation. For each occupational task, the DOL 
assigns scores corresponding to the relative amounts of activity required by the task.  For example, 
managers (SOC code 11-1010) have high mean scores for “Guiding, directing, and motivating 
subordinates” (a work category defined by the DOL), whereas motor vehicle operators (SOC code 53-3000) 
have low mean scores for this category. 
 
Table 5 presents estimates of the LBO treatment effect on workers split across categories.  Column 1 
illustrates that workers with educational attainments of four-year college degrees or higher appear to be 
more affected by PE investment in IT than workers with lower levels of educational attainment.  The 
estimated difference in annualized employment duration for college-educated workers is 0.149 years, 
while the estimated difference in annualized employment duration for other workers is only 0.055 years.  
This finding is consistent with Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1997), who present evidence that IT improvements 
appear to benefit college educated workers relatively more than non-college educated workers.  The 
reason for this difference is that college educated workers presumably have the skills to more quickly 
adapt to new production technologies, thus facilitating their relatively faster rates of human capital 
acquisition and benefiting in the labor market accordingly. Column 2 indicates that workers in 
occupations that are information processing intensive also appear to benefit from private equity 
investments (treatment effect estimate of 0.149 years), relative to workers in occupations with low levels 
of information processing needs (treatment estimate of 0.054 years).  These occupations complement IT 
enabled work practices, as improvements in computing power facilitate more efficient task completion for 
information intensive work.  Similarly, column 3 shows that workers involved in tasks requiring decision-
making and problem solving also appear to differentially benefit from PE investments.  These are also the 
workers who benefit from information technologies that improve decision-making efficiency. These 
technologies allow for greater discretion for decision makers within firms, a finding that is consistent with 
a large literature on IT work practices. 
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To further illustrate the link between PE investment and complementary work practices, columns 4 and 5 
indicate that the labor market outcomes of workers for whom it is important to coordinate work activities 
and guide subordinates (essentially managers) benefit relatively less than workers who are directly 
involved in the production process and could benefit from greater discretion in day-to-day activities – 
precisely the types of tasks that benefit from improvements in IT investment.  Below-median scores for 
both work categories are associated with treatment effects of 0.184 and 0.175, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Impact of Leveraged Buyouts on Employment Duration – By Skill and Occupation 
This table reports the mean differences in long run employment durations (annualized) for workers of firms acquired in leveraged buyout (LBO) 
transactions and similarly matched workers at firms that are not acquired in LBO’s. Standard errors are reported in italics underneath the coefficient 
estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 College 
education 
Processing 
Information 
Making 
Decisions/ 
Problem 
Solving 
Coordinating 
Work 
Activities 
Guiding, 
directing, and 
motivating 
subordinates 
Panel A: Workers in occupations above the median 
LBO Treatment .149*** .149** .120** .035 .037 
 .040 .053 .043 .039 .040 
      
No. of obs. 12,672 19,149 19,193 19,198 19,205 
      
Panel B: Workers in occupations below the median 
LBO Treatment .055 .054 .056 .184** .175** 
 .062 .039 .046 .051 .051 
      
No. of obs. 6,624 19,214 19,170 19,165 19,158 
      
Finally, we show that the effects of PE investment on worker employment tenures are especially strong for 
workers who are retained after the LBO event.  We separate workers into quartiles based on the length of 
time elapsed between the LBO event date and the date when they leave the firm.  The first quartile sample 
contains workers who remain at the firm for 0 to 0.5 years, the second quartile is for workers who stay for 
0.5 to 1.3 years, the third quartile is for workers who stay for 1.3 to 2.5 years, and the fourth quartile is for 
workers who stay more than 2.5 years at the acquired firm. Figure 2 illustrates that workers who exit the 
firm in the first two quartiles do not have statistically different employment tenures from similar workers 
who exit comparable firms.  The only workers who have significantly longer employment tenures are the 
ones who are retained by the acquired firm for 1.3 years or more.  The results are consistent with the view 
that PE investment imparts human capital to workers; the effects of the LBO on worker employment 
tenures appear to be relevant only for workers retained at the firm long enough to work with new 
production processes and are employed for a long enough time to acquire human capital. 
Unemployment Duration 
To shed more light onto the mechanism by which private equity investment impacts subsequent 
employment tenure, we examine worker career paths in more detail. We study the job transitions that 
workers make immediately after their firms are acquired in an LBO.  We first estimate the impact of 
LBO’s on the length of unemployment spells experienced by workers who leave acquired firms.  For each 
worker in our treatment and control sample, we define Post Unemployment Duration as the length of 
time (in years) between the end date of a given job title and the start date of the next most recent job title 
listed on the worker’s resume. Thus, Post Unemployment Duration is the length of time that elapses 
between the date that a treated worker leaves a firm acquired in an LBO, and the date that the worker 
begins at her next employer. For each worker in the treatment sample, we use the nearest neighbor 
matching algorithm to identify four observations from the control sample that most closely match the pre-
LBO characteristics of the treated worker, and we estimate the mean difference in unemployment 
duration for the workers across the two groups. We estimate the ATT by finding control matches for every 
observation in the treatment sample; we do not identify corresponding treatment matches for every 
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observation in the control sample (which would otherwise allow us to compute the ATC and/or the ATE).5 
 
Figure 2. Differences in Long Run Employment Durations for LBO vs. non-LBO workers 
This figure depicts the differences in long run employment durations (annualized) for workers in the treatment sample (LBO workers) vs. workers in 
the matched control sample (non-LBO workers). For all workers in the treatment sample, we compute the distribution of the time elapsed between the 
LBO effective date and the date of job exit. Treated workers are sorted on the quartile of elapsed time to which they belong. The first quartile sample 
contains workers who remain at the firm for 0 to 0.5 years, the second quartile is for workers who stay for 0.5 to 1.3 years, the third quartile is for 
workers who stay for1.3 to 2.5 years, and the fourth quartile is for workers who stay more than 2.5 years at the acquired firm. The solid line represents 
the matching estimates computed for each quartile sample, and the dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals around the estimates.  
 
Table 6 presents the ATT estimates for various combinations of worker and firm characteristics used to 
match individuals across both samples. Column 1 contains the baseline specification, and shows that the 
average worker leaving an LBO acquired firm experiences an unemployment spell that is approximately 
0.194 years (2.3 months) shorter than the average of the comparable control workers. Column 2 adds an 
additional characteristic used to match workers: the profitability of the firm at the time when an 
individual joins the firm (Return on Assets). Adding this variable potentially improves the match rate and 
produces a more precise estimate of the treatment effect. The treatment coefficient with this specification 
is nearly identical to the value estimated in column 1 (-0.193 years), suggesting that the precision of the 
treatment effect in Column 1 is likely to be high already. Similarly, column 3 incorporates firm Capital 
Intensity (defined as the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to firm assets) as an additional 
covariate used to match treatment and control workers, and the estimated treatment effect remains 
economically large and statistically significant: -0.185 years. In columns 4 and 5, we add the length of the 
most recent prior unemployment duration experienced by an individual as an additional covariate used to 
match treatment and control workers, and find equally large estimates ranging between -0.171 and -0.198 
years of shorter unemployment spells for LBO workers. 
 
The identification assumption required to draw causal inference from the estimates presented in columns 
1 through 5 is that our treatment effect (LBO) is independent of unobservable factors that impact worker 
unemployment durations. We provide support for the identification strategy in several ways (with further 
discussion deferred to later sections). First, we note that the robustness of the estimated treatment effect 
across various specifications suggests that our estimates are not biased by omitted factors that might 
explain differential unemployment durations among workers in the treatment and control samples. In 
order for such a factor to explain the results, the factor must be uncorrelated with the numerous worker 
and firm attributes used to identify and match workers in the sample. For example, an unobservable 
                                                             
5  The results are also robust to estimation using a hazard rate model, where the baseline rate of exit from 
unemployment is parameterized for workers who leave firms that have not been acquired by a PE firm.   
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characteristic such as worker ability is unlikely to explain our results, because ability is likely captured by 
our measures of prior unemployment duration, education, labor market experience, race, gender, etc. 
  
We also consider whether our treatment estimates capture general trends in human capital accumulation 
or labor market signaling that could occur in LBO targets even in the absence of a private equity 
acquisition. For example, firms that get acquired by private equity investors might be firms in which 
existing employees accumulate human capital at higher rates and thus subsequently experience labor 
market outcomes that differ from those of similar workers employed elsewhere. To evaluate this 
hypothesis, we identify a sample of individuals who work for firms acquired by private equity investors 
after the individuals leave. If firms acquired in LBO’s systematically improve worker unemployment 
durations even in the absence of private equity investors, then these individuals should also have shorter 
unemployment spells than comparable workers at other firms. We estimate our matching specification for 
this sample of workers using the same variables used in columns 5. Column 6 shows that for this sample 
of workers, unemployment durations are actually longer than the spells experienced by similar employees 
at other firms. Though the results are only weakly significant, the coefficient estimate of 0.074 years 
illustrates that workers of a firm eventually acquired by private equity investors do not experience shorter 
unemployment spells if they leave prior to the firm becoming acquired. The results are consistent with the 
notion that the LBO itself causes changes in the workers’ career trajectory. Moreover, the results likely 
reflect positive assortative matching: lower ability workers sort to underperforming firms – precisely the 
types of companies targeted by private equity investors (Kaplan and Stromberg 2009). 
 
Table 6. Impact of Leveraged Buyouts on Worker Unemployment Duration (Short Run) 
This table reports the differences in unemployment durations immediately after an individual holds a job title at a specific company, for workers of 
firms acquired in leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions and matched workers at firms that are not acquired in LBO’s. Standard errors are reported in 
italics underneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
LBO Treatment -0.194*** -0.193*** -0.185*** -0.198*** -0.171***  
 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.058 0.056  
LBO Treatment      0.074* 
(Prior)      0.040 
       
No. of obs. 24,006 24,003 23,387 15,371 14,968 13,804 
       
Match Variables:        
   Assets x x x x x x 
   Return on Assets  x x x x x 
   Capital Intensity   x  x x 
   Prior Duration    x x x 
 
Occupational Transitions 
Finally, we look at the occupational transitions that workers make after leaving firms that have been 
acquired in LBO’s.  If PE investments in technology enable workers to acquire transferrable skills, then it 
is likely that workers employed at firms acquired in LBO’s are more likely to acquire skills that reflect the 
changing demand for skills in their occupations, and are therefore less likely to have to switch occupations 
when they are displaced relative to workers who leave companies where they have not acquired these 
skills. To evaluate these hypotheses, Table 7 presents results for probit specifications of job transition 
characteristics on the LBO treatment and various measures of individual and firm characteristics.  
Specifically, we control for the various measures of worker and company traits that we use in the 
matching estimation procedures in Tables 4 through 6.  First, we estimate the effect of the LBO treatment 
on the probability of transitioning across different occupations for workers leaving LBO firms vs. workers 
who leave non-LBO firms (the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether a worker is able to 
remain in the same occupation, defined at the 2-digit SOC level). 
 
Column 1 of Table 7 illustrates that workers who leave LBO firms have a lower likelihood of having to 
change occupations when transitioning employers. The estimated treatment effect is 0.105, which 
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illustrates a 10% difference in the relative likelihood of maintaining the same occupation as held earlier. 
Across all other columns in Table 7, as we add controls for various firm characteristics (to control for the 
possibility that occupational transitions might be impacted by the type of business that a worker is 
exiting), we see that the probability of staying within an occupation is the same. To show that this effect is 
driven by the LBO, rather than a firm specific attribute associated with companies acquired in LBO’s, we 
estimate treatment effects for workers who exit treated firms prior to the LBO taking place, and find that 
there are no significant differences in occupational transition likelihoods for these workers relative to the 
control sample. Thus, the evidence supports the view that LBO’s impact a worker’s ability to find new 
employment within a given occupation. 
   
Table 7. Impact of Leveraged Buyout on Occupational Transitions 
The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether a worker maintains the same occupation (measured at the 2-digit Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) level)) when transitioning employers. Staying within the same occupation is coded as a 1. Standard errors are reported in italics 
underneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LBO Treatment 0.105** 0.254** 0.254** 0.254**  
 0.053 0.109 0.109 0.109  
LBO Treatment (Prior)     0.036 
     0.063 
No. of obs. 58,126 13,943 13,940 13,603 7,873 
      
Additional Covariates:      
   Assets  x x x x 
   Return on Assets   x x x 
   Capital Intensity    x x 
 
Identification 
The identification assumption central to the causal interpretation of the findings is that PE investment in 
technology is independent of unobservable factors that impact workers’ labor market outcomes. Although 
this assumption is fundamentally untestable, we conduct several analyses to evaluate the extent to which 
confounding factors may bias our estimates of the impact of PE investment on worker outcomes. 
Collectively, the results of our analyses indicate that the findings are best explained by IT upgrades 
leading to valuable human capital acquisition by employees retained after an LBO. 
Sorting of Workers into Firms 
We show that our findings cannot be explained by unobserved differences in the abilities of workers who 
sort into firms acquired by PE firms and workers who sort into firms that do not get acquired by PE firms. 
The theory of positive assortative matching in the labor market suggests that workers of low ability sort 
into poorly performing firms while workers of high ability sort into companies that have strong 
performance (Becker 1973). This theory has found empirical support in a number of studies in the labor 
economics literature (Abowd et. al 2009). Since PE firms typically target underperforming companies for 
leveraged buyouts (Kaplan and Stromberg 2009), it is likely that firms acquired by PE investors employ 
workers with lower levels of ability than firms that do not get acquired by PE firms. Thus, it is unlikely 
that the relatively longer employment tenures of workers who leave LBO targets can be explained by 
superior ability. Rather, to the extent that there is positive assortative matching between workers of 
heterogeneous ability and poorly performing firms that receive PE investment, our estimates may actually 
understate the impact of technological investment on subsequent labor market outcomes.  
 
The results in Panel B of Table 4 also illustrate that our findings cannot be explained by the effects of 
workers sorting into LBO vs. non-LBO targets based on unobservable ability. If LBO targets attract higher 
quality workers, differences in labor market outcomes should be observed for all workers who join an LBO 
target. However, the results in Panel B indicate that workers who join and leave eventual LBO targets 
prior to an acquisition have labor market outcomes that are statistically indistinguishable from the 
outcomes realized by individuals employed elsewhere. These findings contradict the view that LBO targets 
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systematically employ workers of higher ability than other firms. 
 
Moreover, the results in Figure 2 illustrate that the effects of PE investment on workers are heterogeneous 
across workers who have varying employment tenures after an LBO takes place. If workers in acquired 
firms are of higher average ability than workers employed elsewhere, significant differences in long run 
employment spells should be observed for all workers leaving the LBO target, not only for individuals 
remaining at the firm for more than 1.3 years. These findings indicate that differences in labor market 
outcomes for employees who leave acquired firms and individuals employed elsewhere cannot be 
explained by the endogenous sorting of workers into firms based on unobservable ability.    
 
Sorting of Workers Out of Firms 
We also show that our findings cannot be explained by unobserved differences in the abilities of workers 
who sort out of firms acquired by PE firms and workers who sort out of firms that do not get acquired by 
PE firms. An alternative explanation of our findings is that PE firms shut down divisions of a newly 
acquired company, leading to mass layoffs of workers who have high ability but simply do not fit into the 
operational plans of the company’s new owners. Other workers who leave establishments for idiosyncratic 
reasons could be of lower average quality as such separations reveal low ability that has been directly 
observed by managers. Thus, potential employers can surmise that workers displaced by PE acquisitions 
are of higher ability than individuals who leave firms that do not experience mass layoffs.         
 
This hypothesis is unlikely to explain our findings. First, if workers who leave firms are displaced by mass 
layoffs and have higher ability than similar workers who separate from comparable firms, one would 
expect to find significant differences in the labor market outcomes of workers who leave immediately after 
the LBO. The findings in Figure 2, however, are inconsistent with this theory. Workers who separate from 
an acquired firm within the first 1.3 years after the PE firm takes control have long run employment 
tenures that are no different than the tenures of comparable workers who separate from other companies. 
These workers are among the most likely to be displaced through mass layoff, as empirically 
approximately half of the separations at PE acquisitions take place within two years of the buyout (Lerner 
et al, 2011). Moreover, PE firms typically seek to reap returns from their investments within 5-10 years 
(Kaplan and Stromberg 2009), so it is likely that mass layoffs take place soon, rather than many years 
after a company gets acquired. 
 
Second, it is not obvious that the abilities of workers who leave an acquired firm are superior to the 
abilities of individuals employed elsewhere. One of the ostensible efficiencies that PE firms introduce to 
the firms they acquire is the ability to identify workers of low ability and dismiss them from the target 
firm. Under this hypothesis, one would expect that the labor outcomes of employees that leave LBO 
targets would reflect inferior ability and be worse than the outcomes for other workers.  Our findings to 
the contrary suggest that the true impact of PE investment on labor outcomes is larger than what we are 
able to estimate in this paper. 
 
Sample Selection Bias 
One alternative explanation for our findings is that the workers who leave LBO targets after an acquisition 
who may be displaced due to a mass layoff – and who are therefore of higher average quality – may be 
more willing to post their resumes onto a job search site than workers of similar quality who leave other 
firms. Workers who leave firms that have not been acquired by PE investors – and are of low ability, as 
signaled by the idiosyncratic separation – may be less likely to post resumes onto a job search site (due to 
innate preferences or inability to work with an online service), leading to average differences in ability 
between workers leaving LBO vs. non-LBO targets. This hypothesis is also contradicted by the results in 
Figure 2. If workers leaving LBO firms are of higher quality than comparable workers who leave similar 
firms, one should expect to see differences in labor market outcomes for workers who leave immediately 
after the LBO, not just for workers who leave after 1.3 years. Therefore, it is unlikely that our estimates are 
biased by different propensities of workers with heterogeneous abilities to post resumes online during job 
search.   
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Conclusion 
We analyze a novel employer-employee matched dataset and find evidence that corporate technological 
investment has had a significant impact on workers’ long run labor market outcomes over the last decade. 
We find that following an LBO acquisition, private equity firms invest heavily in IT use.  Retained 
employees whose tasks are complementary to new IT-based production practices experience longer 
employment durations, shorter unemployment spells, and higher likelihoods of staying within their 
occupations. 
 
These findings have implications for understanding variation in labor outcomes. There is much debate, 
yet little empirical evidence, over how technological investment is affecting the labor market outcomes of 
workers. Models abstract away from firm actions when trying to explain worker outcomes such as 
employment durations and wages.  The findings in this paper suggest that during the current wave of 
technological change, firms’ investments play a role in human capital acquisition, and thus, the labor 
market outcomes of the firm’s workers in both the short and long run.  We show one important channel 
by which private equity investment – an especially controversial change in a firm’s organization – impacts 
workers, and illustrate that the failure to account for the impact of technological investment on human 
capital acquisition can lead to misleading conclusions about the effects of corporate polices on workers. 
 
More broadly, the findings in this paper point to the importance of understanding the role of firms in 
workers’ labor market outcomes.  There is currently much discussion over the perceived shortages of 
various skills plaguing the U.S. labor market.  Many scholars suggest that this “skills gap” is the result of 
poorly performing public institutions. Our findings suggest that variation in labor outcomes among 
workers may also be explained by differences in technological investments that impart transferrable 
human capital to workers. Further investigation of the mechanisms through which private sector 
investment develops human capital stock, both theoretically and empirically, can shed important insight 
onto these critical issues. 
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